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IN THE SUPRE:t1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs 
FRANCIS EUGENE KNILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. No. 18122 
B.RIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Francis Eugene Knill was charged in criminal 
proceedings by the State of Utah with one count of 
Theft in violation of Section 76-6-604, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 15, 1981, Francis Eugene Knill was 
found guilty of one count of theft by a jury in the 
Seventh Judicial Court in and for Emery County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Judge Boyd Bunnell presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced on that same date to 
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
( 1) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks relief from the sentence 
imposed as follows: 
For an Order of this court reversing judgment 
and sentence imposed by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant-Defendant and his son were arrested June 
25, 1981 and booked in the Emery County Detention facility 
He appeared before VarLynn Peacock, Justice of the Peace, 
Emery County, State of Utah on June 26, 1981. Defendant 
was not represented by counsel but asked that counsel 
be appointed. Judge Peacock set bail at $15,000.00 and 
·set preliminary hearing for July 22, 1981. 
Defendant was first aware that cot.msel had been 
appointed on July 7, 1981. Charles Taylor, the then 
Emery County Public Defender, was appointed to represent 
both Appellant and his son. Defendant appeared before 
Judge Peacock on July 17. 1981 and waived preliminary 
hearing upon assurance that if Appellant were to plead 
guilty to a felony, his son would not be prosecuted. 
On July 28, 1981 Defen'lant retained private counsel, 
appeared for arraiT)1ment in Di.strict Court of Emery County 
and moved for remand to the Justice Court for preliminary 
(2) 
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hearing. Said Motion was granted. 
On August 18, 1981, no date for preliminary had been 
set. Defendant petitioned District Court of Emery County, 
Civil No. 4010 for Writ of Habeas Corpus, hearing on 
Petition was had on September 1, 1981, writ was issued 
September 9, 1981 and hearing was set for September 14, 
1981. At the hearing, Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge 
ruled without argument by the State, that a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus was not the proper procedure for raising 
the issue of lack of speedy trial and that a Motion to 
Dismiss was the appropriate means by which to raise such 
issue. 
Preliminary hearing was had in the Eleventh Circuit 
Court in and for Emery County on September 10, 1981. 
Appellant was bound over to District Court on two counts. 
Appellant was arraigned October 6, 1981, Defendant 1 s Motion 
to Dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was denied with no 
argument by Prosecution and trial was set for October 15, 
1981. 
Appellant filed ExParte Motion to Produce and Affidavit 
on October 12, 1981. The State filed no response nor 
Affidavit. Motion was denied. 
Appellant filed Motion to Suppress on October 12, 1981 
( 3) 
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with hearing set for 9:00 A.M. October 15, immediately 
prior to trial. The State did not file response nor did 
they argue against said motion. The Motion to Suppress 
was denied. 
Appellant was tried on October 15, 1981, by jury, 
convicted of theft, in violation of Section 76-6-604 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a second degree felony. Appellant 
was sentenced that day to serve one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Penitentiary. 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM STOP OF AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT 
PROB AB LE CAUSE . 
Defendant was stopped by Sgt. Jewkes, Utah Highway 
Patrol. At Motion to Suppress Hearing, innnediately prior 
to trial Sgt. Jewkes testified at page 5 line 8-9 that 
the reason he "probably" stopped was a report on a license 
plate. At Trial page 50 lines 3-13 Sgt. Jewkes testified 
that he had it in his mind he'd probably stop the car and 
called in the licen[~e plate number "as a precaution." At 
the time he took the precaution, the only thing Defendant 
had done was slow down when he saw a highway patrol car. 
( 4) 
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..... (2) a policeman's stopping 
an automobile and detaining the 
driver in order to check the 
driver's license and the registration 
of the automobile constitute an 
unreasonable seizure under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
except in those situations in which 
there is at least an articulable 
and reasonable suspicion that a 
motorist is unlicensed, or that 
an automobile is not registered, or 
that either the vehicle or an 
occupant is otherwise subject to 
seizure for violation of law, such 
rule against random stops and 
detentions, however, not precluding 
a state from developing methods for 
spot checks that involve less 
intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstrained exercise of 
discretion, such as, for example, 
the questioning of all oncoming traffic 
at roadblock-type stops.l at 661. 
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is further set 
forth in Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended as follows: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer 
to stop and question suspect - Grounds-
a peace officer may stop any person in 
a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his action. 
Mere suspicion is not sufficient to establish 
probable cause for a stop2 despite the good intentions 
of an officer3 . 
1. State of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99S.Ct. 1319, 
59 LEd 2d 660 (1979). 
2. Mallory v. U.S., 354 US 449, lLEd 2d 1479, 77S.Ct. 1356, 
frq r; 7' 
379 US 89, 13LEd 2d 142, 85 S.Ct.223,(1964). 
(5) 
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Defendant was stopped on the mere suspicion of 
a police officer in violation of his rights under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence resulting 
from said stop was denied. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
IN THE EARLY STAGES OF HIS PROSECUTION CONTRIBUTING TO A 
DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL . 
. . . (T)he assistance of counsel 
is among those constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial 
that their infraction can never 
be treated as harmless error. 
[Citations Omitted]4 
Defendant, in the case at bar, was incarcerated 
and was not represented by counsel when preliminary 
hearing was set for a date twenty-six days later contrary 
to the dictates of the Utah Code which requires a 
preliminary hearing be had within ten (10) days if a 
. . d 5 person in incarcerate . 
Counse 1 was appointed to represent both De.fendant 
and his son who was similarly charged. Upon advice of 
counsel Defendant was encouraged to waive preliminary 
4. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 55 LEd.2d 426, 98 
S. Ct. 117 3 ( 19 7 8) . 
5. U.C.A. 77-35-7 
(6) 
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hearing and plead guilty in exchange for the dismissal 
of the charges against Defendant's son. Said charges 
were dismissed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in the case of 
Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P2d 437 (1971) 
which involved dual representation by one attorney of 
a husband and wife wherein husband pleaded guilty to a 
felony as a part of a plea bargain and charges were 
dismissed against the wife. The Court held that the dual 
representation did not constitute denial of adequate 
representation. 
However, the Court's attention is called to the 
decision of Cheif Justice Traynor in the CalifoTI1ia case 
of People v. Chacon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P2d 106 (1968) 
wherein the Court said: 
If counsel must represent 
conflicting interests or is 
ineffective because of the 
burdens of representing more 
than one defendant, the injured 
defendant has been denied his 
constitutional right to effective 
counsel. [Citations Omitted]. 
Counsel representing co-defendants cannot· effectively 
represent the Defendant whom he encourages to waive his 
right to confront witnesses and to trial by jury in exchange 
(7) 
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for the release of a co-defendant. 
Here the result of joint representation was a 
delay in the proceedings which constituted a denial of 
Defendants right to a speedy trial. 6 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
The Sixth Amendement of the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah7 guarantees 
the right to a speedy trial. Defendants trial in the 
Court below was held more than three and one-half months 
after his arrest. 
Defendants first preliminary hearing was set 16 
days beyond the limit allowed by the Utah Code. 8 That 
date was waived as discussed at Point II supra. The matter 
was remanded on July 28, 1981 for preliminary hearing and 
the actual hearing was not had until September 10, 1981 --
.two and one-half months after arrest and fortv-four (44) 
days after remand. 
Trial was set in District Court for October 15, 1981 
more than the thirty day limitation set forth·in U.C.A. 
77-1-8(6). 
Defendant was prejudiced by the delay because the 
6. United States Constitution, Amendment Six. 
7. Article I, Section 12. 
8. U. C.A. 77-35-7 
( 8) 
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physical evidence of theft, the automobile, was released 
to the alleged owner on July 6, 19819 and was unavailable 
for inspection by defense counsel when conflict in 
identification of said automobile arose. Had there been 
a timely preliminary and/or a timely appearance of 
appointed counsel, the automobile would have been 
available for inspection. The right to a speedy trial is 
a fundamental right. 10 The purpose of that right is, 
among other things, to limit the possibility that delay 
will impair Defendants defense 11 as it did in this case. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RULING THAT 
HABEAS CORPUS WAS Pu~ INAPPROPRIATE PRETRIAL REMEDY AND 
WAS UNAVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT. 
"Ordinarily the inquiry in a Habeas corpus matter 
is as to the legality of the detention. 1112 
On August 18, 1981 Defendant petitioned the Court 
below for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been denied. 
Twenty-eight (28) days later the District Court Judge ruled 
that Habeas Corpus was not the proper proceeding to raise 




Transcript - page 44 line 14. 
Klo!fer v. North Carolina, 386 
1d , (1967). 
U.S. v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 15 
(1966). 
U.S.213,87S.Ct.988, 18LEd. 
LEd 2d 627, 86 S.Ct. 773, 
1'> ~.1...-L- - • ~-~terest of Hales, 538 P2d 1034 (1975). 
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Rule 65B Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
' 
( f) Habeas Corpus. Appropriate 
relief by habeas corpus proceedings 
shall be granted whenever it appears 
to the proper court that any person 
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise 
restrained of his liberty. If the 
person seeking relief is imprisoned 
in the penitentiary and asserts that 
in the proceedings which resulted in 
his conviction there was a substantial 
denial of his rights under the 
Constitution of the United States or 
under the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, or both, then the person seeking 
such relief shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 65B(i). In all other cases, 
proceedings under this subdivision shall 
be conducted in accordance with the 
following provisions: 
Defendant challenged the legality and constitutionality 
of his incarceration and was told that Habeas Corpus was 
not the appropriate method of complaint. 
Defendant's Motion to dismiss on the same grounds 
was filed September 30, 1981, was heard October 6, 1981 
and denied without argument by the Prosecution forty-nine 
(49) days after Defendants original petition for relief 
J • -
-· 
.... , ·.:, . 
was filed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN.ITS DENIAL 
OF DEFENDANTS PRETRIAL MOTION TO PRODUCE AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS AT TRIAL. 
Upon discovery that there existed conflicting 
( 10) 
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evidence identifying the alleged stolen vehicle, Defendant 
on October 1981 moved for an Order for Plaintiff to 
produce the vehicle for inspection. Said motion was denied. 
At the conclusion of the State's case Defendant 
moved to dismiss because of conflicting testimony regarding 
identification of the allegedly stolen vehicle. Said 
motion was denied without any argument by the State. 13 
The Utah Court has ruled in the case of State v. Hall, 
105 Utah 163, 145 P2d 494, (1944) that: 
Under the authorities, it is clear 
that the State must definitely identify 
the goods fotmd in the defendant's 
possession as the goods which were 
charged to have been stolen before the 
jury may draw an inference of guilt 
based upon the proof of possession 
by the defendant of such goods at 
496. [Citations Omitted]. 
The Court's refusal to Order production and refusal 
to dismiss for the states failure to definintely identify 
the vehicle along with its refusal to give Defendant's 
proposed jury instruction no. 3 constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Utah Court defined "discretion" in Carmen v. Slavens, 
546 P2d 601 (1976) as follows: 
It is true that where the 
authority to perform a proposed 
action rests within the discretion 
of the court we must allow 
considerable latitude in which 
13. Transcript pages 71-72 
( 11) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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he may exercise his judgment. 
But this does not mean that the 
court has unrestrained power to 
act in an arbitrary manner. 
Fundamental to the concept of 
the rule of law is the principle 
that reason and justice shall 
prevail over the arbitrary and 
uncontrolled will of an.y one 
person; and that this applies 
to all men in every status: to 
courts and judges, as well as to 
autocrats or bureaucrats. The 
meaning to the term "discretion" 
itself imports that the action 
should be taken within reason 
and good conscience in the 
interest of protecting the 
rights of both parties and 
serving the ends of justice at 
603 [Citations Omitted]. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits, based on the 
foregoing points and authorities that judgment entered 
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